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Enforcement Provision of the
Wage and Hour Act
By WALTER F. SCHERER*
As we have seen from Mr. Montgomery's comprehensive article,'
Sections 6 and 7 of. the Fair Labor Standards Act provide for minimum
wages and overtime compensation.
Violation of these provisions as well as others in the act is made
a criminal offense and in addition the Administrator is authorized
under Section 1 7 to institute injunction actions in the federal courts to
restrain such violations.
Further and more important than these actions, Section 16 (b) of
the act contains the following provisions creating a right of action and
providing a remedy for any employee affected by a violation of Section
6 or 7:
"Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 6 or
Section 7 of this act shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation. as the case may be, and in an ad-
ditional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jur's-
diction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of him-
self or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such
employee or employees may designate an agent or representative
to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly
situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judg-
ment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable at-
torney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
As we know the constitutionality of the act as a whole was unan-
imously upheld in United States v. Darby Lumber Company,2 and
there seems to be no doubt as to the constitutionality of Section 1 6 (b).
I propose to consider briefly some of the questions arising under
this section of particular interest to attorneys prosecuting or defending
this type of action.
COVERAGE
At the risk of some repetition of what is contained in Mr. Mont-
gomery's article concerning coverage, it may be well to reiterate some
of the more prominent aspects as specifically directed to employee suits.
.*Of the Denver bar.
'Montgomery, Is Your Business Covered by the Wage-Hour Law? (1942) 19
DICTA 39.
-312 U. S. 100. 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed. 609. 132 A.L.R. 1430 (1941).
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The first question that confronts the- attorney for the plaintiff, and
one of equal importance to defense counsel, is whether the plaintiff's
employment is within the coverage of the act. From a cursory exposi-
tion of the salient provisions of the act, it will be seen that coverage
under the act is based upon the view that the power of Congress over
interstate commerce extends not only to the regulation of the working
conditions of employees engaged in that commerce, but also to em-
ployees engaged in the production of goods for that commerce. Indeed,
most of the employees who now benefit from this law do so becaus?
they are "engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce."
Section 3 (j) defines "produced" to mean
"produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner
worked on in any state; and for the purposes of this act an em-
ployee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of
goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufactur-
ing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner work-
ing on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the
production thereof, in any state."
It is important then to know what interpretation the courts are
inclined to place upon this new principle. The older cases concerned
themselves with the "in commerce" concept and the courts generally
hold that production of goods, i.e., manufacture, mining, etc., even
though such goods were intended for shipment and were eventually
shipped beyond the confines of the producing state, was not in itself
interstate commerce, and therefore not within the regulatory power of
the Congress under the commerce clause. '  The leading example of
that narrow construction of the commerce clause is Hammer v. Dagen-
hart.4  However, recent decisions of the high court, culminating in the
Darby opinion, indicate a decided departure from that position, and ap-
proval of the broader view that Congress may, in the exercise of its
power over interstate commerce, regulate those productive processes and
activities that "have a substantial effect on [that] commerce or the
exercise of the Congressional power over it."
The Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of
Labor has stated that:
"Employees are engaged in the production of goods 'for com-
merce' where the employer intends or hopes or has reason to believe
that the goods or any unsegregated part of them will move in
interstate commerce. * * * The facts at the time that the goods
are being produced determine whether an employee is engaged in
'United States v. Darby Lumber Co., supra, note 2. and cases cited therein.
4247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 422, 62 L. ed. 939 (1918).
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the production of goods for commerce and not any subsequent
act of his employer or of some third party."
And this interpretation has been approved by the Supreme Court.5
Except in a few instances, the act predicates coverage upon the
nature of the employee's duties rather than the nature of the employer's
business. The employer may be engaged in a purely intrastate activ-
ity, for example, the renting and maintenance of a loft building used
by tenants engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce; but
his maintenance employees may, nevertheless, be subject to the act be-
cause their activities are necessary to the production of goods for inter-
state commerce." It follows that an employee complaint that fails to
allege facts sufficient to show that the plaintiff is engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the
act will be dismissed.
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION
It is now well established that an employee action tander Section
16 (b) of the act may be prosecuted in either the federal district courts
or in any state court whose jurisdiction under the laws of the state is
appropriate to the entertainment of such claims. The jurisdiction of
the federal district courts is not dependent upon the sum or value in
controversy or the citize.nship of the parties, since the action is one
arising under a law regulating interstate commerce. Nor are such
actions "suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of
the United States" 7 so as to be without the jurisdiction of state courts.
REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS
There have been three decisions by federal district courts on the
question of removal of employee actions under Section 16 (b) from
state courts to federal courts. In Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corpora-
tion,s the court, while rejecting plaintiff's contention that such actions
were not subject to removal and stating that Section 16 (b) could not
be deemed to have qualified the Removal Act, granted the motion to
remand, upon the ground that the petition for removal bad not been
filed within the prescribed time.9 In Stewart v .Hichman,1° the motion
to remand was granted, there being no diversity of citizenship and the
court finding that no federal question was involved since "the statute
"United States v. Darby Lbr. Co.. supra note 2.
"Fleming v. Kirschbaum, 4 W.H.R. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
7U.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §371.
832 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.J. 1940).
'U.S.C.A. Tit. 28. §72.
l4 W.H.R. 47 (W.D. Mo. 1941).
DICTA
is plain and simple no construction or interpretation is called for." The
opinion of District Judge Jones in Kuligowski et al. v. Hart" is to the
same effect. The complaint, filed in the state court, alleged that plain-
tiffs had not been paid overtime compensation as required by Section
7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendant removed the case
to the federal district court upon the ground that it "arises under the
* * * laws of the United States: * * * involves a substantial federal
question: and the sum in dispute exceeds the jurisdiction amount." On
motion by the plaintiff to remand, the court held:
"The case, as made in the plaintiff's petition, does not, as I
see it, involve more than fact questions; does not present a federal
question calling for a construction of the federal statute; nor is
it a cause, the decision of which depends upon the construction of
the federal statute under which the action was brought. Gully.
etc. v. First National Bank. 299 U. S. 109, 114.
"It would be a vain thing for Congress to provide that such
action as this could be maintained in any court of competent juris-
diction, only to permit the action so commenced to be removed to
the federal 'court.
Since all jurisdiction of the district courts arises cut of congres-
sional grant, so the Congress may modify or withdraw jurisdiction.
To the extent that it has given the right to employees to maintain
actions in other courts of competent jurisdiction, it seems reason-
able to conclude that it intended to give the employee the choice
of jurisdiction, not the employer."
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
No time is specified in the act within which actions to recover back
wages must be instituted. While Section 971, Title 28 of the United
States Code provides a limitation of five years within which a suit or pro-
secution for "any penalty or forfeiture" accruing under the laws of the
United States must be commenced, as we have seen, an action for back
wages and the additional liability provided in Section 16 (b) of the
act is not such a suit. The Conformity Act' 2 requires that, in the
absence of a federal statutory provision to the contrary, the laws of the
several states shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. It
would seem then that under this provision the applicable state statute
of limitations will govern in all actions instituted under Section 16 (b)
"Decided by the northern district of Ohio on March 25, 1941, and unreported.2
LU.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §725.
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of the act, whether in state or federal courts. Also, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,2 indicates
that such corollary points as the time when the cause of action accrues,
etc., will be governed by the state courts' decisions under such applicable
statutes of limitations."
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
The general rule is that a cause of action given by a federal statute,
if no specific provision is made by act of Congress for its survival, sur-
vives or not according to the principles of the common law existing in
England at the time of the formation of the Union. And the Statute
of Edward III is regarded as a part of that common law. 15  Generally
rights of action based on contract survived at common law, while those
sounding in tort abated. However, even in tort actions, if the injury
giving rise to the right affected the property of the decedent, such actions,
by virtue of the Statute of Edward III, did not abate. It would seem
that the porion of the liability under Section 1 6 (b) for actual as dis-
tinguished from liquidated damages is founded upon contract. The
duty to pay arises out of the employment contract with the statute as
an operative provision of that contract.'- Hence there can be no ques-
tion of survival as to that portion of the liability.
But when consideration is given to the "additional equal amount"
provided in Section 16 (b), we have an action which, though contrac-
tual in form and substance, permits damages to be given .as for a wrong.
The question of survival of similar actions under the Anti-Trust Act1
7
has been before the courts. Section 1 5 of that statute provides for
triple damages to the party injured by a violation of that act. In
Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters,'8 an action for triple damages under
the Anti-Trust Act was held to survive against the estate of the deceased
wrongdoer; and in Moore v. Backus,19 a similar action was held to sur-
vive in favor of the estate of the deceased plaintiff. The rule is ap-
parently the same where the "deceased party" is a dissolved corpora-
tion. 0  These cases proceed upon the theory that the action for triple
"304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
"See also Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85
L. ed. 1089 (1941).
'Moore v. Backus, 78 F. (2d) 571, 101 A.L.R. 379 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
cert. den. 296 U. S. 640, 56 S. Ct. 173, 80 L. ed. 455 (1935): United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574, 577 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1916).
"Cole v. Harker (W.D. Tenn.), decided October 10, 1939, and not officially
reported.
'7U.S.C.A. Tit. 15, § 1, et seq.
"36 F. (2d) 1000 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1925).
"Supra note 15.
-'Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985, 986 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
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damages is an action for injury to the plaintiff's property as a result of
an illegal conspiracy; and that while such an action sounds in tort, it
survives and may be pursued against the estate of a deceased person
because the property or the proceeds or value of the property belonging
to the plaintiff have been appropriated by the deceased person and added
to his own estate or money. 21  This exception, as originally stated in
the Statute of Edward, covered only the death of the injured party.
However, judicial decisions have extended its application to cases where
the defendant wrongdoer is the deceased; provided always, that the
wrongful act resulted in both a decrease in the estate of the injured party
and an increase in that of the wrongdoer.
If then, the "additional equal amount" provided in Section 16 (b)
is merely an incident to the main liability for back wages and takes upon
itself the character of such main liability, it is contractual in nature and
will survive. If, on the other hand, recovery of the "additional equal
amount" be deemed to be separable and sounds in tort, it is believed
that, on the basis of the reasoning applied in the above cases under the
Anti-Trust Act, and action under Section 16(b) would also survive;
the estate of the deceased plaintiff-employee is decreased and that of the
deceased defendant-employer is correspondingly increased by the differ-
ence in money between what was actually paid and what might have
been found due under Section 16 (b).
PARTIES
Section 16(b) provides for three kinds of employee actions: an
action by the individual employee for himself only; an action by one
or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves and other em-
ployees "similarly situated"; and an action by an agent or representa-
tive of an individual employee or employees on behalf of all employees
'similarly situated." The first type of action presents no unusual
difficulties; the question of parties being governed by general principles
of law. The second and third type have occasioned several questions;
principally, the application of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Paragraph (a) (1) of Rule 23. As indicated by Professor
Moore22 this paragraph of the rule provides for "true class actions" as
the same were known at common law. The test of a joint or common
right is whether the owners of the right are so related that no one of
them could enforce the right, or his interest in the right, without the
compulsory joinder of all of the others. Under this test both the class
'Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 615, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46 L. ed. 713 (1902);
United States v. Daniel, 6 How. 11, 12 L. ed. 323 (1848) ; Moore v. Backus, supra
note 15: Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters, supra note 18.
22 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2236.
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and the representative action provided by Section 16 (b) of the act are
clearly not true class actions. Normally the relationship of each em-
ployee to his employer results from a contract between the two, express
or implied, and such contract is unrelated, in the rights and duties thereby
created, to the contractual relations that might exist between the em-
ployer and his other employees. Any one employee could, at common
law, sue his employer for unpaid compensation without being com-
pelled to join all of his fellow employees in the action. There is nothing
in Section 16 (b) or in its legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended to change this situation and provide for the compulsory joinder
of employee claims under the act.
Paragraph (a) (2) of Rule 23. Since the class or representative
action under Section 16 (b) does not have for its object "the adjudica-
tion of the claims which do or may affect specific property involved in
the action," obviously Rule 23 (a) (2) has no application.
Paragraph (a) (3) of Rule 23. It follows that if the class or
representative action provided in Section 16 (b) of the act is to be
brought within the purview of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it must necessarily come within paragraph 3 of that
rule. While the rights of the individual employees may be several,
and common relief in the form of money damages may be sought, it is
by no means certain that in each case a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights will be involved. Assuming, however.
that this latter qualification may also be satisfied, there would seem to
be no material advantage to be gained by attempting to bring such
actions within the limits of paragraph 3 of Rule 23. The judgment
rendered in actions under this paragraph of Rule 23 binds only those
parties actually before the court,'23 and recovery is limited to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs named in the complaint and to such other employees
as intervene, or joins in the suit as plaintiff, or actually designate an
agent or representative to maintain the suit on their behalf. 24  As Pro-
fessor Moore points out:
"A person, who because of a common question of law or fact
may be said to be a member of a class on whose behalf or against
whom a spurious class suit (actions falling within Rule 23 (a) (3))
is pending, may either ignore the action or intervene 'and become a
party of record. Once having done the latter, however, he is a




"'Saxton v. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.Ga. 19,40) Tedder v. Economy
Wholesale Grocery Co. (S.D. Fla.), decided January 30. 1941: Brooks v. Southern
Dairies, Inc., 4 W. H. R. 191 (S. D. Fla. 1941). But cf. Cissel v. The Great A.
U P. Co., 4 W. H. R. 135 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
'Supra note 22 at 2292.
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The class or representative action under Section 16 (b) is author-
ized by that section, and the additional authority provided in Rule 23
(a) (3) is not necessary.
When are employees "similarly situated" within the meaning of
Section 1 6 (b) ? In several cases instituted by former employees on be-
half of themselves and other employees of the defendant similarly situ-
ated, the defense has been made that the plaintiff, not being a present
employee of the defendant,. cannot be deemed to be similarly situated to
defendant's present employees. This contention has been consistently
overruled.2 16 In Clint v. Franklin Bargain House, Inc., 2 1 the. court re-
lied upon the opinion in Independent Transportation Company v.
Canton Insurance Office,28 and held that the word "employed," as used
in the definition of "employee" in Section 3 (e) of the act, "is a verb
of past and present tense," and that "it is obvious that one who had
worked and not been paid according to the act could bring the action
the same as if he were still employed." The court also overruled the
contention that "similarly situated" referred to defendant's other em-
ployees who are in the same class or in the same. department as the
plaintiff, and held that "taking the purpose of the act into considera-
tion" the term "similarly situated" means "all employees who have
not been paid according to the provisions of the act." "The act was
intended to and does link together all employees who are not paid ac-
cording to its provisions and as to them creates a question of common
interest. Each is given the right to have his claim presented in the
action of a fellow employe."
MANDATORY NATURE OF THE ADDITIONAL LIABILITY
ATTORNEY'S FEES, ETC.
In several decisions under Section 16 (b) it has been held that an
award of the "additional equal amount" plus attorney's fees and cost
is mandatory, and not dependent upon the willfulness of defendant's
violations. "-2 This view is supported by a comparison of Section 1 6 (b)
and Section 16 (a); the latter, providing criminal penalties, expressly
"'Tedder v. Economy Wholesale Grocery Co., supra note 24; Rakestraw v.
Miami Bottled Gas Co. (S.D. Fla.) decided January 30, 1941; Clint v. Franklin
Bargain House (Ct. of C. P., Lucas County, Ohio, No. 158,258, decided about
April 1, 1941).
"Supra note 26.
'173 Fed. 564 (W.D. Wash., 1909).
'Le Fevers v. General Export Iron Z6 Metal Co., 36 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Tex.
1940) : Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co., 33 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1940);
Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, 17 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 851 (1940); Eichorn v.
Kilkenny, 1940 Wage and Hour Manual 354 (Com. Pl., Passnic Co., N. J. 1939) ;
Floyd v. Dubois Soap Co., 4 W. H. R. 77 (Com. P1. Hamilton Co., Ohio) ; Abroe
v. t.insay. 4 W. H. R. 38 (Mun. Ct. Minneapolis, Minn. 1941).
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requires that the element of willfulness be established. Also the lan-
guage of Section 16 (b) uses the mandatory expression that the em-
ployer "shall be liable . . . in an additional -equal amount as liquidated
damages" and "the court .... shall . . . award . . . a reasonable at-
torney's fee ... and cost of the action" in the event judgment is awarded
to the plaintiff. That Section 16 (b), in providing for liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, and cost to the successful plaintiff, does not
contravene the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment seems to be
established both by analogy to the Anti-Trust Act, supra, and the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court upholding similar state enactments al-
leged to be violative of the due proccss clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 0
SECTION 16 (A)
Section 16 (a) of the act is as follows:
"Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of
Section 15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this sub-
section except for an offense committed after the conviction of
such person for a prior offense under this subsection."
It will be noted that the question of specific intent is material under
this subsection. As a matter of record the Wage and Hour Division
has only filed criminal charges in cases where the violations were flagrant,
chiefly the payment of sub-minimum wages, and where the defendant
has evidenced a wilful and deliberate attitude of defiance of the law.
The Division has filed a total of 190 cases; convictions were secured
in 145 cases while 3 defendants were acquitted. Fines imposed ranged
from $1.00 to the $10,000.00 maximum. As yet the Division has
not had occasion to file a second offense case and consequently no one
has as yet received a jail sentence.
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
The Administrator is authorized under Section 17 to bring in the
federal courts an action for injunction to restrain violations of the act.
The statutory action entitled "An Act to Supplement Existing Laws
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies and For Other Pur-
poses" ,'31 provides the procedure and the usual allegations of an ordinary
injunction action are included in the complaint. An added feature is
the inclusion in the prayer that the decree in addition to restraining
'Life U Casualty Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 54 S. Ct. 482, 486, 78 L. ed.
987 (1934), and cases reviewed therein.
'U.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §381.
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future violations, restrain the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced in violation of the act.
Complaints of this nature have been filed in 2,523 cases, decrees
being entered in 2,512. In many instances where the employer has
voluntarily agreed to make restitution of back wages to his employees
and to comply with the act in the future, the Administrator has waived
the "hot goods" restraint allegation and the employer has been allowed
to ship his product without hindrance.
The courts have now, three years after the effective date of the
act passed upon almost every conceivable legal aspect and while the
several courts have often times arrived at different conclusions substan-
tial precedent now exists on most problems of legal interpretation. The
Division has maintained an excellent publicity service and is most
anxious to serve, not only the employee and his counsel but also the
employer, to the end that the principal objectives of the act, "the main-
tenance of minimum conditions necessary to the health, efficiency and
general well-being of workers" may be soon universally achieved.
Law School Enrollment Drops
Law school enrollment in Colorado has been vitally affected by
the war, and further drop in enrollment for the fall of 1942 is ex-
pected. "Speed-up" courses and courses on military law will not,
however, be offered by the law schools in this state.
Part of the decline in enrollment in law schools seems to be at-
tributed to causes other than the war. For the period 1938-1941 the
decrease in the number of law students in the United States was ap-
proximately 13,000, or 35 per cent of the total law school enrollment
in the United States.




University of Colorado 129 106 76
U niversity of D enver ------------------ --------- 78 67 56
Westminster University 85 73 67
Present enrollment in each of the three schools in the order named above
is 52, 33, and 55 students respectively. It is expected that these
present enrollments may drop by forty per cent by the fall term of 1942.
